Research
Areas of Specialization: Philosophy of Neuroscience & Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Biology, Moral Psychology, Biomedical Ethics (including Neuroethics)
I believe that the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science are mutually-supportive areas of philosophical inquiry. We can understand the mind better by carefully examining the sciences of the mind and brain. Conversely, we can understand cognitive neuroscience better through philosophically sophisticated accounts of mental functions and operations. My work concerns the nature of functional localization in the human brain, the nature of psychological kinds, and whether neuroscience (particularly neuroimaging experiments) can be used to revise our “cognitive ontology” or taxonomy of psychological kinds. This research intersects with numerous debates in the philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., literature on mechanistic explanation and natural kinds), biology (e.g., about attributions of function in biological sciences), and mind (e.g., whether neuropsychology supports concept empiricism).
Neuroscience and Cognitive Ontology
How do psychological kinds (working memory, anger, neuroticism, etc.) relate to neuroscientific kinds (brain regions, networks, neurotransmitter systems, etc.)? Recently, a number of prominent neuroscientists and philosophers have argued that brain imaging data shows that our taxonomy of psychological kinds is flawed. For example, some psychologists believe fMRI data shows that the brain does not have systems dedicated to “anger,” or “fear.” But can we really learn from a brain scan that our taxonomy of psychological kinds should be revised? Much of my recent work examines the idea that fMRI can be used to revise our cognitive ontology by discovering new psychological kinds, lumping or splitting existing ones, etc. The main issues in this area are: (1) which psychological constructs—e.g., “response inhibition”—are valid items in our psychological taxonomy, (2) what is the relationship between these constructs and the mechanistically or computationally defined functions of brain regions/networks, and 3) can neuroscience compel us to revise the scientific taxonomy of psychology and/or our taxonomy of folk psychological concepts—if so how would this revision work?
This summer, I received a grant from Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP) to organize a workshop on cognitive ontology and to develop this line of research. The conference, "Fitting the Mind to the Brain: Deliberations on Cognitive Ontology." Took place this October. Videos from the conference will be publicly available soon, so e-mail me if you are interested.
Philosophy of Mind and Psychology
As a philosopher of mind, I interested in how both behavioral and brain data inform traditional debates in the philosophy of mind, including the nature of the emotions, nativism versus empiricism, the nature of memory, modularity of mind, and the role of emotions in moral judgments. I have previously written (see publications) about how research in neuroscience, including neuropsychology (e.g. semantic dementia) and neuroimaging, informs contemporary debates about the nature of concepts, such as whether or not concepts are perceptual representations. I discussed this research at the Imperfect Cognitions Blog. Future directions include a critical look at pluralistic theories of concepts and an examination of the senses in which (at least some) aspects of conceptual knowledge might be amodal or disembodied.
Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Biology, Moral Psychology, Biomedical Ethics (including Neuroethics)
I believe that the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science are mutually-supportive areas of philosophical inquiry. We can understand the mind better by carefully examining the sciences of the mind and brain. Conversely, we can understand cognitive neuroscience better through philosophically sophisticated accounts of mental functions and operations. My work concerns the nature of functional localization in the human brain, the nature of psychological kinds, and whether neuroscience (particularly neuroimaging experiments) can be used to revise our “cognitive ontology” or taxonomy of psychological kinds. This research intersects with numerous debates in the philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., literature on mechanistic explanation and natural kinds), biology (e.g., about attributions of function in biological sciences), and mind (e.g., whether neuropsychology supports concept empiricism).
Neuroscience and Cognitive Ontology
How do psychological kinds (working memory, anger, neuroticism, etc.) relate to neuroscientific kinds (brain regions, networks, neurotransmitter systems, etc.)? Recently, a number of prominent neuroscientists and philosophers have argued that brain imaging data shows that our taxonomy of psychological kinds is flawed. For example, some psychologists believe fMRI data shows that the brain does not have systems dedicated to “anger,” or “fear.” But can we really learn from a brain scan that our taxonomy of psychological kinds should be revised? Much of my recent work examines the idea that fMRI can be used to revise our cognitive ontology by discovering new psychological kinds, lumping or splitting existing ones, etc. The main issues in this area are: (1) which psychological constructs—e.g., “response inhibition”—are valid items in our psychological taxonomy, (2) what is the relationship between these constructs and the mechanistically or computationally defined functions of brain regions/networks, and 3) can neuroscience compel us to revise the scientific taxonomy of psychology and/or our taxonomy of folk psychological concepts—if so how would this revision work?
This summer, I received a grant from Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP) to organize a workshop on cognitive ontology and to develop this line of research. The conference, "Fitting the Mind to the Brain: Deliberations on Cognitive Ontology." Took place this October. Videos from the conference will be publicly available soon, so e-mail me if you are interested.
Philosophy of Mind and Psychology
As a philosopher of mind, I interested in how both behavioral and brain data inform traditional debates in the philosophy of mind, including the nature of the emotions, nativism versus empiricism, the nature of memory, modularity of mind, and the role of emotions in moral judgments. I have previously written (see publications) about how research in neuroscience, including neuropsychology (e.g. semantic dementia) and neuroimaging, informs contemporary debates about the nature of concepts, such as whether or not concepts are perceptual representations. I discussed this research at the Imperfect Cognitions Blog. Future directions include a critical look at pluralistic theories of concepts and an examination of the senses in which (at least some) aspects of conceptual knowledge might be amodal or disembodied.